In this paper I quantify a gain that a country receives when its global influence is considered to be admirable by others. I use a standard gravity model of bilateral exports, a panel of data from 2006 through 2013, and an annual survey conducted for the BBC by GlobeScan which asks people in up to 46 countries about whether each of up to 17 countries were perceived to have "a mainly positive or negative influence in the world." Holding other things constant, a country's exports are higher if it is perceived by the importer to be exerting more positive global influence. This effect is statistically and economically significant; a one percent net increase in perceived positive influence raises exports by around .8 percent. Succinctly, countries receive a commercial return on their soft power.
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Introduction
In this paper, I show that countries do well by doing good. More precisely, I show that a country sells more exports to other countries which perceive it to be a force for good, holding other factors constant. These higher exports can be viewed as a carrot that rewards behavior admired by others, symmetric to the sticks more commonly used in international commerce. A prominent example of the latter currently is the "Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions" (BDS) campaign being used currently by Palestinians against Israel. 1 My results show that global behavior perceived to be better/worse has a material effect on exports; countries admired/disliked by others reap a direct economic benefit/cost, even without any formal organized intervention.
I use a panel of recent data and a plain-vanilla gravity model of trade to show that countries seen to be exerting a positive influence on the world export more to their admirers, holding a host of other factors constant. My point estimate is that a one percent net increase in perceived positive influence raises exports by around .8 percent, holding other things constant. That is, I find an economically and significant trade effect of this "soft power" of being an attractive country; being perceived as a force for good has a direct economic payoff. Succinctly, winning hearts and minds also wins sales. I find this effect to be relatively (but not completely) insensitive to a variety of robustness checks.
Methodology and Data
I am interested in the question of whether countries with more soft power achieve any tangible commercial benefit; I do this in the context of international trade. This seems natural since the question is intrinsically international in scope.  {λ it } is a complete set of time-varying exporter dummy variables,  {ψ jt } is a complete set of time-varying importer dummy variables,   ij represents the myriad other influences on exports, assumed to be well behaved.
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The coefficient of interest to me is γ, which I interpret as the effect (on bilateral exports) of the importer's perception of the exporter's global influence or soft power, ceteris paribus. I estimate this equation with least squares, using robust standard errors.
The Data Set
The data set is taken from Glick and Rose (2015) ; it relies on trade data drawn from the I consider the BBC/GlobeScan to be a manifestation of "soft power", although this interpretation is not strictly necessary for this study. 5 Soft power is a term first used by Joseph . 6 Nye thinks of this as "…the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences … consistent with their own." 7 The BBC/GlobeScan measure seems like a good way to measure the manifestation of soft power, since it asks implicitly about the attractiveness of a country. 8 The BBC/GlobeScan measure is certainly not a perfect indicator of soft power. 9 For one thing, it does not distinguish explicitly between hard (military) and soft power. 10 There are also more technical problems with the variable. Most importantly, the data coverage is limited in span. This is not a Here too, there is considerable dispersion across both countries and time. The two figures in the bottom part of the figure are analogous, but present data of the (mainly positive and negative) global influences of other countries, as perceived by the United States. Figure 3 is the analogue for China. 12 In practice, I usually use the (natural) logarithms of positive and negative separately in equation
(1); in my statistical work I divide net perceptions by 100. 13 Some descriptive statistics on log positive, log negative and net perceived influence are presented in Table 1 . In the bottom panel of Table 1 , I also present simple bivariate correlations between the key variables. There are few surprises, and the simple correlations do not lead one to believe that equation (1) will suffer from multicollinearity. 14 7
Results
Benchmark estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 2 . There are three sets of results tabulated, one for each of the measures of perceived influence (log positive, log negative, and net).
The gravity model I employ implicitly tests for the relevance of perceived world influence, while holding the usual suspects constant. All influences of either the exporter or the importer in a given year (such as its output, population, culture, politics, geography, or armed forces) are accounted for by the time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects. In addition, the model includes a number of dyadic features that have been found in the literature to affect exports, as surveyed by Head and Mayer (2014).
These include both physical and cultural distance, the former modeled through log distance and a dummy variable for a common land border, the latter through dummies for common language and colonial relationship. I also include two policy controls, for joint membership in a regional trade agreement, and the use of a common currency. Although I treat the {β} coefficients as nuisances, they seem sensible in statistical and economic magnitude; distance reduces trade with the traditional coefficient of approximately unity, while two countries that share a common language, regional trade agreement, or colonial relationship experience substantially more trade (the effects of land or monetary borders are insignificant in this sample of countries). This is a heavily parameterized statistical model with fewer than nine observations per parameter. All these controls manifestly result in an equation that fits the data well; the R 2 exceeds .8 in this panel, while the RMSE is less than 1.1 (the standard deviation of log exports ≈ 2.6).
What is the additional effect on exports from x to y of the (mainly positive) global influence of x as perceived by y? The coefficient is tabulated in the top-left cell of consistent. An exporter perceived to be exerting more of a negative influence experiences exports that are lower by an economically and statistically significant amount. The coefficient estimates of positive and negative influences have different signs but also different magnitudes; the effect of positive perceived influence is almost twice as big as the effect of negative influence. This absence of symmetry implies that it may not be appropriate to combine the two together into a single net effect, as the righthand column does. Still, the perceived net effect tabulated there is also positive, and statistically large. regress log exports on the regressors of equation (1), omitting only the effect of influence. Next, I
regress influence on the same set of regressors. I then plot the influence residual (on the y-axis) against the export residual (on the x-axis). There are three different scatter-plots, one for each of the three measures of influence (log mainly positive, log mainly negative, and net), each with the corresponding least squares fitted line. The effect of influence is visible, though not overwhelming; the effect does not appear to be driven by outliers.
Robustness Table 3 provides sensitivity analysis. The objective is to check if the baseline results of Table 2 - in particular, the estimates of γ, the effect of perceived world influence on exports -are robust to small changes in the underlying methodology. For convenience, the default estimates from Table 2 are tabulated in the first row of Table. Each subsequent row presents estimates of γ derived with some change to the methodology (summarized in the column at the extreme left).
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The first check concerns changing the dependent variable; I replace exports from 1 to 2 with exports from 2 to 1. I expect this placebo experiment to fail; indeed the γ coefficients are reassuringly small and insignificantly different from zero.
The But not all; adding dyadic fixed effects eliminates the key effect. This sensitivity makes me cautious, and reluctant to over-interpret my results.
Instrumental Variables
The importer's perception of the exporter's global influence is probably measured imperfectly by the BBC/GlobeScan survey; this measurement error may be an issue. It is possible that one reason why importers think more or less highly of a particular exporter's global influence is because the importers consume the exporter's products; that is, causality could flow both ways between trade and perceived influence. 17 Most worryingly, some third factor could be driving both perceptions of influence and trade simultaneously. For all these reasons, estimating (1) with instrumental variables is warranted. can be seen from the scatter-plots of Figure 5 . 18 I construct instrumental variables for mainly negative and net perceptions of global influence similarly; each is displayed in Figure 5 .
My instrumental variable estimates are tabulated in as an IV for the BBC/GlobeScan measure. This strategy is likely to work only for the case of measurement error. Despite the fact that it reduces the sample size by a factor of five, the resulting IV estimates of γ remain economically and statistically significant.
Summary
Succinctly, countries which are seen to be exerting a more positive influence in the world tend to sell more exports to their admirers, holding a host of other phenomena constant through the workhorse gravity model of trade. This result is economically and statistically powerful, and reasonably (though not completely) robust to a wide variety of potential econometric challenges.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have demonstrated that a non-standard, non-economic determinant of tradesoft power -seems to matter quantitatively in an otherwise conventional empirical model of exports. In particular, countries that are admired for their positive global influence reap the benefit of higher exports, holding other things constant. This result is economically and statistically significant, reasonably (but not completely) robust to a variety of potential econometric issues, and seems intuitive.
It may also be important; if the benefits of soft power include an unappreciated export boost, too little soft power may be generated. Countries like Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Israel that are maligned as a mostly negative influence in the world suffer lower exports than they otherwise would.
I don't want to over-state my confidence in these conclusions for at least two reasons. First, considerably more data is needed to be really sure of this result; I have a small number of observations for my proxy for soft power spanning a short period of time and few countries (for my purposes, the problem is further complicated by the fact that I need intrinsically bilateral measures). Second, including dyadic fixed effects reduces the economic size of the effect and, more importantly, eliminates its statistical significance; this makes me nervous about making any strong claims. That said, I
tentatively conclude that countries exerting soft power seem to receive an unexpected benefit in the form of higher exports. Instrumental variable is (log) importer's favorable/unfavorable/net opinion of exporter, Pew survey.
Coefficients on regressors named in column header; robust standard errors recorded parenthetically. BBC/GlobeScan question: "Please tell me if you think each of the following are having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world …" Coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) significance level marked by one (two) asterisk(s). Regressors included but not recorded: log distance; dummy variables for currency union, common language, land border, RTA, colonial relationship, importer x year fixed effects, exporter x year fixed effects. 
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